FACTUAL ACTIVITY RECORD · An activity record based on work that took place
(Not applied) Withdrawing the permission-profile approval proposal
Auditing real sessions, testing a least-privilege proposal, and rejecting it when it diverged from the intended request
Purpose
The work explored how assigned Roles could avoid waiting for approval on reversible workspace edits and temporary-file operations while keeping secrets, out-of-bound writes, and destructive actions gated. Because command rules do not govern other approval layers such as file edits, connectors, and GUI operations, the causes first had to be separated using records from real sessions.
A proposal therefore replaced one workspace-write setting with separate read and edit permission profiles and synchronized command gates, an audit script, and operating documents. The CEO ultimately determined that the work did not match the intended request and withdrew the proposal in full.
Implementation
Read-only session records from July 12 through 13:51 on July 15, 2026 were audited, separating 155 approval responses, two hard stops, and 2,365 ordinary waits. An approval response was correlated with an actual operation only when exactly one candidate existed in the time window; nine records with no candidate or multiple candidates remained unmatched instead of being inferred.
- The edit-role proposal allowed writes to the workspace and temporary areas but denied secret-like file patterns, out-of-bound locations, and local-server binding.
- The read-role proposal kept the workspace read-only and allowed writes only to
/tmpand the runtime temporary area. - Network access was limited to required domains, while managed policy and external connector and GUI approvals remained explicitly outside project configuration.
Command rules proposed allowing only safe wrappers, forbidding direct rm, and prompting for destructive Git operations. A negative matrix checked that the same gates applied through ordinary invocation as well as working-directory options, global options, and command git, covering 22 forms of reset, restore, clean, rebase, forced transmission, and discard switches.
The audit script proposal structurally redacted authorization headers, credential flags, URLs, and environment assignments, and stopped output when it found an unfamiliar secret-like high-entropy value. Fixtures covered fake credentials, known secret markers, and ambiguous time correlation, while generating the audit twice checked reproducibility.
- Initial checks found that destructive Git and alternate invocation forms could miss their gates after workspace write access was broadened.
- They also found a sanitizer that could emit credentials, fallback correlation to a recent operation, and incomplete mapping between completion conditions and evidence.
- The candidate corrected these issues and passed eight audit regression tests, a 22-form negative matrix, snapshot reproducibility, and a secret scan.
Permission profiles would have loaded in the next session; they would not retroactively change the managed permissions of a running session. An edit Role with workspace-wide write access would also retain nonzero risk even with command rules and operating gates. After these effects and residual risks were explained, the CEO determined that the direction itself did not match the intended request.
[permissions.project_edit.filesystem]
":minimal" = "read"
":tmpdir" = "write"
glob_scan_max_depth = 8
[permissions.project_edit.filesystem.":workspace_roots"]
"." = "write"
"<secret configuration>" = "deny"Rendering diagram…
What was confirmed
Verification results
The candidate separated file access for read and edit Roles, restricted networking, command gates, and secret-safe auditing into three distinct layers.
TOML and strict configuration loading, the nine-Role inventory, command rules, eight audit regression tests, snapshot reproduction, secret scanning, cross-references, and diff-format checks succeeded.
However, workspace-wide writes for edit Roles meant project rules alone could not eliminate every risk from unknown invocation forms, managed policy, connectors, or GUI operations.
The final candidate was never applied to a live session, so reduced approval waits, runtime behavior of the read and edit profiles, and effects on remote clients or external approval layers were not verified.
The CEO explicitly determined that the work did not match the intended request and withdrew the candidate and its related work. At the cutoff, checks confirmed that only the original state remained at the intended destination.
Basis for completion
After the CEO's rejection, this investigation was complete as not-applied when checks confirmed that the proposed configuration, rules, audit script, and documents had not reached the intended destination and only the original state remained.